Identity Theft and
the Challenges of Caring
for Your Virtual Self
Jennifer Whitson
Carleton University | jwhitson@connect.carleton.ca
Several recent high-profile
incidents have thrust identity
theft into the media spotlight.
The first to gain notoriety
involved the credit-verification
company ChoicePoint, which
in 2004 inadvertently delivered
electronic files containing the
names, addresses, social security
numbers, and credit reports for
almost 140,000 people to identity thieves in the Los Angeles
area. In 2007 the British government lost computer disks that
contained the personal details
of every family in the country.
In both cases, the media and
authorities articulated a series
of anxieties about how this data
could be exploited. A plethora of
security experts quickly emerged
to offer citizens concrete advice
on how to mitigate the risk of
identity theft, including tips on
both prevention and on what to
do if victimized. These tips, the
rationale behind them, and their
implications have provided considerable fodder for this article.
Every year there are similar
stories of corporations losing
customers’ personal information,
and while citizens are repeatedly told to protect themselves,
the parties responsible—both
the companies that lost the data
and the thieves themselves—are
often unscathed.
Although there are different
definitions of identity theft, the
crime typically involves illegally
using someone else’s personal
information to secure some benefit. Thieves acquire such information through various sources
and means, including customer
service representatives, hacking and data-mining programs,
“dumpster diving” for personal
documents, and stealing computers. Victimization ranges
from single-instance fraud to
more elaborate, extended uses
of a person’s identity. And while
estimates of the extent and cost
of identity theft differ, it is commonly recognized as the most
rapidly escalating form of crime
in both North America and the
United Kingdom.
The rise in identity theft parallels the rise of bureaucratic
identity markers such as driver’s licenses, credit cards, and
passports. The shift to an information economy means that
people interact with each other
at a distance. Over the phone,
on the Internet, through the
mail, people use these markers to verify their identity and
their trustworthiness. As they
go about their daily lives, they
actively invoke or unknowingly
draw upon a host of markers, in
the process producing yet more
information about their behaviors that institutions store,
analyze, and sell. Making a purchase with a debit card, opening
a door with a swipe card, telephoning a friend, requesting a
travel visa, driving on electronic
toll roads—an expanding range
of activities leaves informational traces that cumulatively
compose a dispersed and loosely
coordinated network of information that can be drawn together
in particular configurations to
produce detailed profiles of a
person’s behavior, health, travels, consumption patterns, and
so on. These profiles are commonly referred to as “data doubles [ 1].” They are the lifeblood
of new forms of informational
capitalism and e-governance,
and are used to ascertain a person’s trustworthiness and value
as a customer, as well as to
streamline services and improve
corporations’ daily operations.
Data doubles are also a prime
target for identity thieves.
Institutions anxious about the
risks inherent in data doubles
falling into the wrong hands
are now championing assorted
projects of personal information
management designed to reduce
the prospect of identity theft.
Several initiatives have been
established to counter iden-
[ 1] Haggerty, Kevin
D. and Richard V.
Ericson. “The Surveillant
Assemblage.” British
Journal of Sociology, 51
(2000): 605-622.
