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21. Palo Alto Research Center. The CCNx Project ( Content-Centric Networking); http://blogs.parc.com/ccnx/

22. Perrig, A., Szalachowski, P., Reischuk, R.M., and Chuat, L. SCION: A Secure Internet Architecture. Springer, Berlin, Germany, 2017.

23. Raychaudhuri, D., Nagaraja, K., and Venkataramani, A.

MobilityFirst: A robust and trustworthy mobility-centric architecture for the future Internet. ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and Communications Review 16, 3 (July 2012), 2–13.

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6–9). Internet Society, Reston, VA, 2011.

27. Toonk, A. Massive route leak causes Internet slowdown. BGPmon, June 12, 2015; http://www. bgpmon.net/massive-route-leak-cause-internet-

28. Zhang, X., Hsiao, H.-C., Hasker, G., Chan, H., Perrig, A., and Andersen, D.G. SCION: Scalability, control, and isolation on next-generation networks. In Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland, CA, May 22–25). IEEE Press, 2011.

 

David Barrera ( [e-mail]) is a postdoc in the Network Security Group at ETH Zürich in Switzerland.

Laurent Chuat ( [e-mail]) is a Ph.D. student in the Network Security Group at ETH Zürich in Switzerland.

Adrian Perrig ( [e-mail]) is a professor in the Department of Computer Science and leads the Network Security Group at ETH Zürich in Switzerland and an ACM Fellow.

Raphael M. Reischuk ( [e-mail]) is a senior IT-security researcher at ETH Zürich in Switzerland focusing on network and Web security.

Pawel Szalachowski ( [e-mail]) is a senior researcher in the Network Security Group at ETH Zürich in Switzerland.

Copyright held by the authors.

Publication rights licensed to ACM. $15.00

sible, remote ASes can be connected via IP tunnels, but their communication depends on the BGP routing protocol. As the testbed expands, we expect more participants will connect directly to benefit from SCION’s full feature set.

To use SCION, ISPs at a minimum must deploy a border router capable of “encapsulating” and “ decapsulat-ing” SCION traffic as it leaves or enters their networks. SCION ASes must also deploy certificate, beacon, name, and path servers that can run on commodity hardware. Deploying SCION in homes or businesses is designed to require little effort, initially with no changes to existing software or networking stacks or replacement of end-user network devices. This ready connection is achieved through a gateway device that transparently switches communication over to SCION if the remote endpoint is also SCION-enabled. Several companies are currently exploring commercialization of these technologies, notably the startup Anapaya Systems, which offers SCION routers.

Conclusion

SCION is an Internet architecture that provides security, availability, transparency, control, scalability, and more (see the sidebar “The Future Looks Bright with SCION”). SCION offers numerous advantages over the current Internet and supports other future Internet proposals as an underlying building block for highly reliable point-to-point communication.

Despite its research maturity following six years of effort, SCION is still in its infancy in terms of deployment. While requiring relatively small changes by ISPs and domains, broadening adoption is SCION’s foremost goal. We expect the benefits for various stakeholders will provide strong incentives for adoption, leading to islands of SCION deployment. In the long term, connections and mergers among islands will enable ever-increasing numbers of native SCION end-to-end connections.

Working on SCION has let us consider
Internet architectures from a clean-
slate perspective. The absence of limit-
ing constraints (imposed by the current
Internet environment) has been par-
ticularly rewarding, as the deep explo-
ration of this problem space enables
us ask not how a future Internet can
achieve what the current Internet has
already achieved, but rather what addi-
tional features can and should a future
Internet offer. We anticipate the in-
sight into the possible applications of
a secure, dynamic, highly available net-
work will help engage the network com-
munity to leverage SCION for its appli-
cations and contribute to the project.

Our 2017 book SCION: A Secure Internet Architecture describes the architecture in more detail, including authentication, name resolution, deployment, operation, extensions, and specifications. 22

 

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