can perform better than they can, they should consider another career path. Welcome to capitalism.

And so on…

The questions. The questions here fall into two groups: those about the power of government to regulate automated legal assistance and those about the wisdom of doing so. That is, can government prohibit automated legal assistance, and, if it can, to what extent should it?

Do people have a right to write, read, and run software that embod-ies ideas about how the law works? To what extent are people free to provide automated legal assistance? Is there a right to receive such assistance? To what extent can government enjoin or punish such provision or receipt? Is the distribution of software that helps people with their legal needs an activity that needs to be “authorized?” What is the right regulatory response? Is it good policy to forbid automated legal assistance? Should lawyers be given a monopoly over legal software, as well as over in-person legal services? In general, what are the appropriate boundaries? What principled lines can we draw in this area?

Unauthorized practice of law. Most states have defined law practice, as well as its unauthorized variants, in statutes and case law. Most such definitions extend to the selection and preparation of documents.

Attorneys General, bar authorities, and private plaintiffs in the U.S. have initiated proceedings against providers of automated legal assistance. Several matters are mentioned here to illustrate.

In the Parsonsk case, the Texas Un-
authorized Practice of Law Committee
sued two manufacturers of software
that helped people prepare wills and
other documents, and was granted
summary judgment by the court. The
case was mooted when the Texas leg-
islature crafted the following statutory
exception:
“In this chapter, the ‘practice of law’
does not include the design, creation,
publication, distribution, display, or
k See Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v.
Parsons Tech. Inc., 1999 Westlaw 47235 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 22, 1999) vacated, 179 F.3d 956 (5th
Cir. 1999)

is an occasional
harm sufficient
reason to forgo the
power of modern
information
technology to make
a dent in the vast
unmet need for
legal assistance?

sale, including publication, distribu-
tion, display, or sale by means of an
Internet website, of written materials,
books, forms, computer software, or
similar products if the products clearly
and conspicuously state that the prod-
ucts are not a substitute for the advice
of an attorney.”l
In the Reynosom case, the court
found a provider of software for bank-
ruptcy preparation was engaged in
UPL, laying stress on the point that
websites are “put together by people.”
Many state bar committees have
opined on this subject; for instance, in
March 2010 the Pennsylvania Bar Asso-
ciation Unauthorized Practice of Law
Committee concluded as follows:
“It is the opinion of the Pennsyl-
vania Bar Association Unauthorized
Practice of Law Committee that the of-
fering or providing [in Pennsylvania] of
legal document preparation services as
described herein (beyond the supply of
preprinted forms selected by the con-
sumer, not the legal document prepa-
ration service), either online or at a site
in Pennsylvania is the unauthorized
practice of law and thus prohibited,
unless such services are provided by a
person who is duly licensed to practice
law in Pennsylvania retained directly
for the subject of the legal services.”n

That is, according to authorities in at least some states many of the services in the section on automated legal assistance are violating the law.

Policy

The case for prohibition. Arguments in favor of disallowing automated legal assistance generally involve protection of the public and of the legal profession:

Protecting the public. Some people
will undoubtedly be harmed by auto-
mated systems. Defective or incom-
plete legal assistance can cause sig-
nificant damage, and it is reasonable
to assume such damage is more likely
l See Section 81.101(c) of the Texas Govern-
ment Code
m See in re: Jayson Reynoso: Frankfort Digital Ser-
vices et al. v. Sara L. Kistler, United States Trustee
et al. 447 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2007)