table 1. an overview of topics discussed in this article.
infection Pathways
Physical
in-person
Secondhand via infected device
Found
gift
infected from Manufacture
Lent
Returned
used
technological
Remote or in-network
direct Compromise
eavesdropping
Man-in-the-Middle
Social engineering
Human assets
the Biosphere
emotional Well-being
Financial Well-being
Personal data
Physical Well-being
Relationships
Societal Well-being
Defensive Goals
device Privacy
device Availability
device operability
Command Authenticity
execution integrity
data Privacy
data integrity
data Availability
environment integrity
Activity Pattern Privacy
Presence Privacy
occupant identities
Sensed data Privacy
Sensor validity
Sensor Availability
Device Risk axes
Potential exposure to Attack
Communication Capabilites
Communication Behavior
the Cloud
Software updates
Configuration defaults, user interfaces, and users
Sensors
Actuators
Power
Connectedness
Storage and Computation
the home is filled with a diverse range
of technologies with varying levels of
security, hybrid communication structures, and no centralized security management system. From a human perspective, the home contains private and
semi-private spaces shared by children,
parents, siblings, elderly, roommates,
and guests. Interpersonal dynamics,
varying levels of security expertise, and
different social and technical preferences all contribute to complicating the
home technology security landscape. In
order to effectively create and evaluate
defenses, it is important to first understand the threat landscape.
Attack Scenarios. One unique aspect
of the new home technology space is
the vast array of attacks that it enables—
many of which differ in effect from Web
or desktop attacks. The increasing presence of electronics in the home—
controlling our houses and coordinating
our lives—provides unique opportunities for the technically savvy criminal.
Table 2 breaks down attacks into
three tiers: low-level mechanisms, in-
termediate goals, and high-level goals.
The low-level mechanisms listed in Ta-
ble 1—such as denial-of-service attacks,
tampering with logs, or eavesdropping
on network traffic—will be familiar to
anyone who has experience with com-
puter security. However, the additional
focus on sensors and actuators is some-
thing that is not generally encountered
with traditional computing devices.
Similarly, the high-level goals behind
the attacks (blackmail, extortion, theft,
and vandalism, among others) are the
same motivations that one encounters
with all criminal activities. Arguably,
the most novel aspects of attacks on
the home ecosystem are the intermedi-
ate goals: the ways in which the unique
capabilities of devices or the assets to
which they have access enable criminal
opportunities.
Attack targets. For many types of
attacks, an adversary could either attempt to target a particular person of
interest or simply take advantage of
known hardware and software flaws to
indiscriminately attack any vulnerable
victim. Attacks on a designated person
require that the adversary identify useful exploits for the target’s particular
technology configuration. On the other
hand, for attacks on “low-hanging” targets—attacks of exploitative opportunity—the adversary need only focus on
a known exploit and locate victims who
are vulnerable to that exploit.
The physical and the electronic. At a
high level, it is interesting that the presence of actuators and sensors in the new
home environment allows interactions
between the physical and electronic
states of devices. It is possible to perform electronic attacks with physical
consequences, but it is also possible to
perform physical attacks with electronic
consequences, or attacks that have both
physical and electronic components.
As an example of a physical attack that
has electronic (then physical) consequences, an adversary might apply a
bright, directed light source to an external light sensor in order to trick outdoor
flood lighting into turning off. Similarly,
one can imagine an attack where physically tricking a system sensor causes the
system to enter a fail-safe mode that is
more easily compromised via electronic
attack.
Infection Pathways. The challenges
of the home environment—such as its