makers decide to issue some dictum just because it seems like a good idea. Then, the technology solution providers readily agree, knowing full well that the new policy will be totally unenforceable. The policy becomes nothing more than window-dressing for the industry.

 

Data is money, and that goes to the core of the browser-security debate. Browser users do not fully appreciate the value of their own data, but the Facebooks and Googles of the world certainly do. Introducing measures to help users protect their data gets in the way of milking that data for all its worth. That is a strong disincentive for implementing strong browser privacy protection measures.

Adding stronger security also comes with a trade-off—more security usually means less functionality. With loss of functionality comes loss of market share, which vendors fear more than anything.

Only when users begin to see the value of their data and demand more protection for it will privacy measures get their due. If the market shifts in this direction and vendors see that adding better protection to their browsers could actually increase market share, then and only then will those measures become standard operating practice.

 

GN-N: We talked a little earlier about how it’s the browser users, rather than the browsers themselves, that are the real products here. Anyone care to expand?

RB: Well, that is the case, and it’s fundamental to this whole space. I would argue that every last conundrum in the area of browser security is rooted in the fact that we are not dealing with a classic commercial model. That is, at present users don’t pay browser makers for software or, for that matter, the maintenance and upkeep of that software.

JG: The browser makers are monetizing your data, directly or indirectly, and therefore cannot see a way to protect that data without losing money. That makes for a really difficult situation.

BL: I’m not sure you can actually say it’s the browser makers who are “ monetizing your data.” If anything, it’s the sites that are monetizing your data.

JG: Actually, there is a clear interplay there. Just look at Google Chrome; it’s pretty obviously monetizing your data. The Mozilla guys derive 98% of their revenue directly from Google. Then you’ve got Microsoft, which you could argue is also desperate now to get into the advertising business. So that raises the question: How can you work to institute healthier business incentives when those efforts are so obviously at odds with the foundation the whole business sits upon?

BL: I don’t know. One of the problems with privacy is that it is difficult to put a value on it. It’s difficult even to convince the users that their own privacy is actually worth all that much.

JG: Maybe users just aren’t all that aware of what they’re giving up with every single mouse click.

BL: Right, but there are a few companies such as Allow (http://i-allow. com) that will sign you up quite explicitly for $20 to $50 for each site you’re willing to share your information with. There also are various experiments under way to establish the value of each Facebook “Like,” for example. They are finding that, while some users’ information is quite valuable, there are many others whose information is largely useless.

RB: I think this question rides a bigger value wave where the age dynamic comes into play. It’s hard to find anybody under the age of, say, 25 who really cares about privacy. My young nieces happily tell me they have never felt like they had any privacy to begin with, so why should they start caring now?

GN-N: You have also got those people who lived through the 1960s and 1970s when the stories were rampant about people having their data exposed by the government. There are plenty of people that age who have just become inured to privacy violations. They might have cared at one point in their lives, but they’re over that now.

JG: Another aspect of this is that security and privacy have become conflated. For example, if you have decided you can trust Google with your data, then the question is no longer about privacy; it’s all about security. On the other hand, if you don’t trust your provider, you can distinguish between security and privacy.

Once you cross that threshold and decide to trust someone with your data, you’re in kind of the same situation we were talking about earlier with regard to the CA model. That is, you’re essentially stuck with trusting them forever. It’s not like you can take back your data from Facebook and say, “Hey, you’re not allowed to have that anymore.”

GN-N: Yeah, just try!

JG: You can get a copy of your data—and, according to [WikiLeaks’] Julian Assange, that can literally run to 1,000 pages. But, guess what, I don’t think they are going to delete that information.

RB: Violations of our trust are already common occurrences even in the holy of holies—namely, the healthcare space, where you’d like to believe the protection of personal data would be considered sacrosanct. If people’s trust isn’t being honored in that domain, what hope can we hold out for more faithful protection anywhere else?

JG: That’s why the fact that Do Not Track is off by default really bothers me. By the time users figure out what it is they’ve given up, there’s no way to undo the damage or to take back any degree of control. As [computer security specialist] Bruce Schneier once pointed out, there’s no delete button in the cloud, or at least there’s no guarantee that, once you’ve pressed delete, things are actually going to be deleted.

GN-N: Is there any cause for hope?

JG: I have a pretty good strategy for protecting my own data—at least it’s good enough to improve my level of comfort. I think it’s an approach other people could use. The challenge is that it takes some behavioral discipline and a bit of know-how, both of which are lacking for most users. There has also been little motivation for people to work on cleaning up their acts since, for the most part, they’re not even aware of the issues we’ve been talking about. Still, I’d say there is some reason for hope in that there are steps you can take to protect yourself.

GN-N: Do you see the browser vendors helping matters at all?

JG: No. To give you an example: since I really don’t like the whole SSL model, I’ve put SSL VPNs (virtual private networks) on the Amazon cloud so that, no matter where I am, I can be encrypted over a hostile or untrusted network