sionals have an obligation to explain these risks.

Pilot projects are routinely declared successes, regardless of any problems encountered. However, it is dangerous to draw conclusions from a “ successful” Internet voting pilot project. There is little reason to attack a small pilot project, and a malicious player might refrain from attacking a major election until the new technology is entrenched. Having claimed success, independent of proof of the accuracy of the pilot project, Internet-voting vendors and enthusiasts routinely push to extend Internet voting to a broader group of voters, thereby seriously undermining election security. Computer professionals must object to pilot projects that do not plan for an assessment of the integrity of the election and a public reporting of any dis-crepancies encountered.

Unlike legitimate computer-security experts, malicious attackers are not likely to publicize their attacks, just as credit-card thieves do not openly advertise their thefts. When election officials and policymakers ask for proof that a voting system has been attacked, it is important to keep in mind that detecting well-devised attacks is inherently difficult. The burden of proof that a voting system has not been attacked should fall on those making the claim, not the other way around.

Ultimately, the balance between the integrity of election technology on the one hand and convenience on the other is both a public-policy and a technological issue. Decision makers must be warned of all the risks in order to craft wise policy.

Acknowledgment

We are grateful to the referees who provided us with excellent recommendations.

 

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Barbara Simons ( [e-mail]) is a retired IbM research staff member, board Chair of Verified Voting, and former aCM President. Douglas W. Jones ( [e-mail]) is an associate professor in the department of Computer science of the university of Iowa in Iowa City.