ACM
Transactions on
Accessible
Computing
◆◆◆◆◆
This quarterly publication is a
quarterly journal that publishes
refereed articles addressing issues
of computing as it impacts the
lives of people with disabilities.
The journal will be of particular
interest to SIGACCESS members
and delegrates to its affiliated
conference (i.e., ASSETS), as well
as other international accessibility
conferences.
◆◆◆◆◆
www.acm.org/taccess
www.acm.org/subscribe
There have also been some minor complaints about the driving mechanisms
in the Corolla and Camry models, and
stalling in some Corolla models. Overall, during a 12-month period, Toyota
recalled some 10 million vehicles
through August 2010—an extraordinary number given that the company
sold only approximately seven million
vehicles during this same period. 2
In the software business, producers and consumers are accustomed
to product defects and an occasional
recall as well as lots of “patches” or
product fixes (see my earlier
Communications column, “Who is Liable for
Bugs and Security Flaws in Software?”
March 2004, p. 25). Compared to automobiles, though, software product
technology is relatively new, and the
design and engineering processes are
highly complex, especially for large systems with many interdependent components. But to what can we attribute
so many quality problems in an industry as mature as automobiles and in a
company so renowned for quality and
manufacturing? Moreover, when even
the mighty Toyota can falter, what does
it say about “staying power”—the ability of a firm to sustain a competitive advantage and keep renewing or expanding its capabilities?
systems and managerial
Process Problems
One way to think about the Toyota
debacle is to divide the problem into
categories: the production system, the
product development system, and, for
lack of a better term, general manage-
to what can we
attribute so many
quality problems in
an industry as mature
as automobiles and
in a company so
renowned for quality
and manufacturing?
ment. These systems and managerial
processes also reflect intangible corporate values such as what kind of commitment the organization has to quality and customer satisfaction.
The Toyota production system does
not seem to be the cause of the quality
problems experienced over the prior
decade. In the past, Toyota has exhibited a significant advantage over its
mass-producer competitors in physical
and value-added productivity. The competition has improved, but it is unlikely
that any firm has actually passed Toyota
in manufacturing prowess. Data related
to manufacturing or assembly quality,
such as the number of defects reported
by customers in newly purchased vehicles, generally has placed Toyota at
the top of the auto industry or at least
among the leaders. This past year was
different due to the recalls—Toyota
fell from sixth to 21st in the annual J.D.
Power’s survey of initial quality. 3 However, the recent quality problems expose the limits of Toyota’s production
system. Making components or receiving supplier deliveries “just-in-time”
as the assembly lines need the components minimizes inventory and operating costs, and exposes quality problems
visible to assembly workers. But it does
not detect design flaws that surface
during usage of a product.
In terms of product development,
including design and testing processes, Toyota has slipped a notch. The
company seems to have tried too hard
to reduce costs due to rising competition from low-cost but high-quality
competitors such as Hyundai in Korea
or new entrants in China. It is clearly
a lapse in design and testing when
accelerator pedals get stuck on loose
floor mats, or when new types of plastic pedal materials become sticky after
being exposed to moisture and friction. It is also a problem of design and
testing when drivers feel that braking
software or on-board computer controls and sensor devices seem to malfunction or operate crudely. Toyota’s
engineers and U.S. government safety
investigators have not been able to
replicate the conditions that caused
some customers to complain about
these software-related problems.
But the kinds of problems we saw in
2009–2010 indicate Toyota engineers
need to do a better job in product de-