figure 2. how clearer search-engine optimization guidelines would affect stakeholders.

search engines + less risk of lawsuits

– slightly less freedom fighting abusive search-engine optimization

clearer
Guidelines

search-engine
optimization Consultants
+ Able to guarantee clients that
their practices are accepted
+ optimization gets easier
– less value of inside knowledge
and contacts

Webmasters
+ easier Website
optimization for search engines
+ less risk of sudden ranking demotion

users + increased relevance of results

al Trade Commission in 2002 recommending search engines ensure that “paid […] results are distinguished from non-paid results with clear and conspicuous disclosures,” 16 all major search engines implemented such practices. Also, self-regulation would help the process of regulation keep up with the pace of technological change. Finally, as clearer guidelines would arguably favor all stakeholders, search engines would at least join the public dialogue on self-regulation.

Policymakers could signal the importance of targeted manipulation and initiate a dialogue on self-regulation by creating a committee of key stakeholders to examine cases of rank demotion and recommend ways to improve today’s optimization guidelines. In addition, the topic of search-engine regulation could be put on the agenda of the next United Nations Internet Governance Forum ( www.in-tgovforum.org).

Self-regulation alone may not alle-
viate concern about rank demotion.
One idea from the Internet’s early
days may chart another way forward.
As disputes over domain names be-
came more heated in the 1990s and
U.S. trademark law proved insuffi-
cient, the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (www.
icann.org) and the World Intellectual
Property Organization (www.wipo.
int) developed the Uniform Domain-
Name Dispute-Resolution Policy
( www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp.htm) to
promote quick and inexpensive reso-
lution of domain-name conflicts. 6 A
similar body could help establish new
optimization guidelines and manage
the mediation process.

conclusion

Here, we’ve argued for the need to open a debate on how to regulate targeted ranking manipulation that hinders search-engine optimization. These practices threaten democracy and free speech, fairness, market efficiency, autonomy, and freedom from deception. Making the case for regulation can be based on the search market’s failure of information asymmetries and concentration of market power over an essential product in a private entity. Our analysis of specific regulatory proposals and their implications for stakeholders highlights the benefits of establishing clearer guidelines for optimizers.

 

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Patrick Vogl ( [e-mail]) is a graduate of the mphil in technology policy at the Judge Business school, university of cambridge, u.K.

Michael Barrett ( [e-mail]) is a reader in Information technology and Innovation and Director of programmes at the Judge Business school, university of cambridge, u. K.

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