engines. In this context, Pasquale20
drew an interesting analogy with cred-it-reporting agencies providing reasons for adverse credit information to
consumers. 20 It would favor the interests of users and especially Webmasters, because it would support Website optimization for search engines.
Search-engine optimizers would
probably be divided between the less
influential that gain and top performers that lose from greater transparency. Building on the credit-agency
analogy, Pasquale20 argued that the
cost to search engines and risk of algorithmic reverse engineering would
be low. 20 However, as the number of
potential queries on rank demotion is
arguably much higher than the number on adverse credit ratings, cost to
the search engines would likely be
significant. Moreover, search engines
would likely oppose any obligation to
provide precise reasons for each rank
demotion, as it would increase the
risk of lawsuits.
Installation of ombudsmen and process of appeal. Taking the previous
proposal a step further, some have
called for an appeal process against
rank demotion. 24 For example, Forsyth10 emphasized if search engines
were public entities with ensuing
accountability, a process of appeal
would probably already have been
established. 10 While Google offers a
way to submit pages for “
reconsideration,” 8 such appeals are judged internally without transparency, and, while
successful in some cases, a Webmaster’s only option might be to attract
enough publicity to get a search-engine representative to take up the case
internally. 9
Installing a formal, transparent appeals process would clearly be in the
interest of both users and Webmasters, while assisting some search engine optimizers but diminishing the
value of top optimizer contacts. On
the other hand, search engines would
arguably incur somewhat higher costs
for installing such a process. Moreover, a formal process with a clear
chance of success would facilitate appeals, thereby increasing numbers of
requests and probably encouraging
“appeal gaming.”
Clearer guidelines for search engine
optimization. Current guidelines be-
tween black-hat and white-hat search
engine optimizers are gray, often
forcing Webmasters and optimizers
to speculate as to which techniques
would be punished through ranking
degradation. In a personal interview
on search engine optimization, one
search-engine consultant said the
key to differentiating between black-
hat and white-hat optimization tech-
niques in unclear cases is “implica-
tion of intent.” However, in the 2008
case of Hewlett-Packard mentioned
earlier, comments by search-engine
optimizers indicate the existence of
at least some bias distinguishing be-
tween permitted and illicit optimiza-
tion methods.
table 1. stakeholder interests in the regulation of search bias.
interests
users ˲ ˲ high-quality content, particularly quick query
response and inclusion of new pages; clear,
well-structured results; transparent construction
of results
˲ ˲ Pleasant search experience, easy usability
search engines ˲ ˲ Protection of trade secrets, particularly
algorithms
˲ ˲ Freedom to make changes to algorithms for
preventing abuse of search-engine optimization
˲ ˲ low cost of regulation
high
Webmasters ˲ ˲ Consistent, transparent ranking of pages in
search engines
search-engine
optimizers
˲ ˲ top group: low transparency
˲ ˲ low-level search-engine optimizers:
high transparency
awareness of manipulation
low
low, some among
professionals
high
table 2. Regulatory proposals and stakeholder interests.
++ strongly supportive
+ supportive
— opposed
— — strongly opposed
Regulatory Proposal
obligation to provide reasons for rank
demotion
installation of ombudsmen and appeal
process
++
clearer guidelines for search-engine
optimization
++
users
++
search
engines
—
content
Providers
search-engine
optimizers
++ divided
—
++
divided
+
++
divided
november 2010 | vol. 53 | no. 11 | communications of the acm 71