underlying the four contexts, each threat is followed
by a discussion of the possible countermeasures, along
with countermeasures used in other contexts that may
be relevant.
Threat 1. Free riding, or asymmetry between giving and receiving. Asymmetry manifests itself as a
lack of contributed resources for maintaining and
improving the common pool of resources [ 2].
Contexts. OSS. OSS lends itself to free riding, as no
contribution is requested in return for the use of freely
available resources [ 12]. Countering the threat
involves motivating potential contributors. This can
be done by highlighting contributor benefits: learning
from the expertise of peers in a technical community
[ 6, 12]; being able to tailor software to one’s personal
needs [ 12]; having fun [ 9]; having the opportunity to
signal status [ 5], potentially enhancing employment
prospects [ 6, 10]; having the opportunity to support
self identification [ 4]; and having the opportunity to
help others.
Computing grids. In two-way grids, asymmetry of
resource contributions
can be countered
through agreements
amongusers to align
Nonexcludable High
receipt levels with contribution levels. In one-way Low
grids, motivation to contribute is required in
order to reduce free riding. The literature is limited on grid contribution
motivations, but according to a SETI@home survey,
the main one is “the good of humanity” (59% of
respondents). Other motivations may include the performance of competing contributor groups. Motivations revealed in other contexts could also support
contribution, including the public display of one’s
abilities, the prospect of self identification, and status
signaling.
Wireless networks. Free riding manifests itself when
a user password-protects his or her own access point
or shuts it down when not using the commons [ 2].
Here, too, an effort to encourage the motivations discussed in the other contexts, including the prospect of
self-identification and status signaling, helps reduce
free riding.
Content. Like other nonexcludable goods, content
lends itself to free riding. To mitigate against the limitations of online cooperation and collective action,
online networks require ongoing interaction, identity
persistence, and knowledge of previous interactions
[ 5]. Other potential countermeasures discussed in the
literature include: making people publicly commit to
Table 2. Typology of
GARN-facilitated goods.
contribution; increasing social validity by demonstrating to potential contributors that many people like
themselves have benefited from contributions; and
creating contribution ratings by participants who rank
contributors highly (the Slashdot model) [ 1]. In addition, countermeasures used in the OSS context may
be useful, including incentives, such as the opportunity to display one’s abilities and the opportunity to
signal status and help others.
Threat 2. Use of others’ resources without their
knowledge or consent.
Contexts. OSS. Because OSS is nonexcludable,
project hijacking is a potential threat, such as when an
OSS is packaged with proprietary code in order to
take it private [ 8]. Countermeasures include: adopting
software that restricts proprietary appropriation;
encouraging compliance with licensing terms through
normative and legal sanctions; incorporation as a way
to protect individual contributors from liability;
transferring individual property rights to nonprofit
corporations; trademarking a project’s brands and
logos; trademarking a
foundation; and protect-
Nonrival
ing a project’s brand [ 8].
Computing grids. The
threat is not significant in
Computing grids the grid context as long as
-Collective good contributing computers
are protected from unau-
thorized access (excludability). Failure to provide this
protection can result in others using their processing
power or storage capacity. Ways to prevent the unwarranted use of resources includes: monitoring traffic;
building firewalls; and establishing legal agreements
among grid parties.
Wireless networks. Taking over contributors’ devices
is a significant threat; access is nonexcludable, making
this commons good susceptible to the “tragedy of the
commons.” This threat can be countered through various security products [ 2]. In closed commons, it can
be countered by monitoring the network for bandwidth use and removing devices that continuously
overuse bandwidth [ 2].
Content. The threat here is the use of knowledge-based content produced without acknowledging the
source. As both knowledge-based content and OSS
are public goods, this threat can be countered in ways
similar to the open-source software tactics identified
in [ 8]. For example, Wikipedia is copyrighted, and
proprietary appropriation is prohibited; Wikipedia is
incorporated, and its contributors are protected from
liability; individual property rights are transferred to a
nonprofit foundation; and the Wikipedia brand is
trademarked.
Low
Wireless LAN
-Commons good
High
OSS, wiki-based content
-Public good