etary protocol IEEE 802.11b. While the products are still backward compatible with the open standard backed by the IEEE, Linksys gives users a strong incentive to use Linksys hardware exclusively. Another large manufacturer, D-Link, does exactly the same thing; however, the proprietary extensions of D-Link and Linksys are not compatible. For the community, the danger of proprietary extensions is that it may not be compatible with the next generation of the open standards (in this case IEEE 802.11n), and if the proprietary extensions have become entrenched, none is willing to adopt the next open standard version. Thus, the network has moved from a situation where organizations could choose to buy open standard compatible equipment from a number of independent suppliers to a situation where standard evolution has stopped and there is only one supplier of a proprietary de facto standard. In fairness, it should be noted that neither D-Link nor Linksys has been successful in their effort to manifest their proprietary extensions as de facto standards; however, the risk remains.

Organizations should keep their options open by buying packaged software that is close to compatible standards; and if they are already using proprietary standard packages, they should keep their eyes open for gateway standards as a way to break an existing lock-in to a proprietary extension. 13 At the very least, organizations should be conscious of the adoption of proprietary extensions, document their use in the organization, and consider which steps will be necessary to discontinue their use in the future; that is, a viable exit strategy.

Generic software packages do not
meet all the requirements of an organi-
zation; 8, 28 there are therefore plenty of
options offered as part of the package
to configure it as needed. 16, 30 Often local
practices or cultural issues add to the
desire to customize or localize the pack-
age. 5, 22 Customization is different from
configuration in that customization
is more radical and adds functionality
that was not an intended generic feature
in the original package. Customization
is more lucrative for local software ven-
dors compared to selling the package it-
self. For the adopting organization, the
option to customize may appear shiny,
but for several reasons, could turn out
to be false gold. 20, 23, 35 First of all, the
customization is often expensive and
represents sunk costs that, in practice,
limit the choices when the package or
service contract is up for renewal. 5, 20
Second, when upgrading the software
to the next version, usually all custom-
izations have to be re-implemented. In
addition, the new features of the next
version are obviously not part of the cus-
tomization that was implemented from
the previous version. 8 Beatty and Wil-
liams5 recommend “un-customizing
customizations” before any upgrade is
attempted because they are found to
form major technical obstacles and are
the main threat to achieving a Return
on Investment. Instead, Beatty and Wil-
liams5 propose that an upgrade is an
opportunity to review critically existing
customizations in order to determine
whether they are really needed, and if
so, to determine if they are supported
in the new version and eligible for elim-
ination. In line with this, we advocate
avoiding any comprehensive custom-
ization of packaged software, unless
absolutely necessary.

 

Principle five: choose a software package with accessible knowledge. When an organization chooses to use custom-built software, it must carry the entire burden of training and retaining personnel to develop the necessary skills to use the software. The use of packages, however, promises access to knowledge of the package’s application and implementation. Ideally, the network of organizations using a package is matched by a network of individuals competent in configuring and using it, but often the supply and demand of certain skills is not aligned, as is pointed out by Light. 23 If there is an unmet demand for knowledge and skills, both user and producer organizations suffer. One historical example of misaligned networks is that of ERP systems, where the number of people with knowledge and skills of the configuration of SAP systems is far less than the demand from user organizations. The result is disproportionately high costs for the people component of SAP implementations and delayed projects with reduced or poor functionality.

Producers employ various strategies for ensuring a pool of knowledgeable users for their software. 11 One strategy is to produce free or low cost versions so that interested people will be more likely to sample it. Another variation is to make “ academic versions” of the software package available as free downloads, or to bundle the package with textbooks used in educational institutions. The process of institutionalizing skills is more complex for packages based on open source (sendmail, emacs, Linux, among others), where there may be no single trusted certifying institution corresponding to the owner or vendor of a package. Instead, other forms of legitimization are used, such as a person’s rank in recommender-systems such as discussion Web sites. Such online networks also make it possible to determine the contributions of a particular member, enabling potential employers to retrieve an account of a person’s skills in regard to a particular software package.

The co-development of the two networks (that of the producers and that of the users) has high path dependence to the point of being quasi irreversible. 11 For a new competing software package that starts with essentially no network; the existing network forms a formidable entry barrier that is difficult to break. 6 If the new package is proprietary and the owners are willing to invest, one way for the new standard package to achieve a critical mass of users is for the owner to bear some or all of the costs for the organizations willing to switch. 33 An alternative approach is to invest in building gateway features into the new standard package, thus easing the transition from an incumbent package. 13 When Microsoft Word was winning over the majority of the word processing market from WordPerfect in the first half of the 1990s, Microsoft sought to circumvent the knowledge barriers by providing WordPerfect users an easy passage. Microsoft Word featured two gateways: an alternative user interface where Microsoft Word could be made to emulate the keyboard shortcuts of WordPerfect, and “Help for WordPerfect users” where the use of Microsoft Word was explained in terms that WordPerfect