Are Internet Protocol addresses per-
sonally identifiable information? What
is “public” and what is not? Is encrypt-
ed data secure? Can anonymized data
be re-identified? Researchers we have
spoken with are occasionally rebuffed
by their IRBs—the IRBs insist that no
humans are involved in the research—
ignoring that regulations also apply to
“identifiable private information.”
Another mismatch between com-
puter science research and IRBs is
timescale. CS research progresses at a
much faster pace than research in the
biomedical and behavioral fields. In
one case we are aware of, an IRB took
more than a year to make a decision
about a CS application. But even two
or three months to make a decision—
typical of many IRBs—is too slow for a
student in a computer science course
who wants to perform a social network
analysis as a final project.
For example, one of our studies,
which involved observing how members of our university community responded to simulated phishing attacks
over a period of several weeks, had
to be shortened after being delayed
two months by an understaffed IRB.
With the delayed start date, part of
the study would have taken place over
winter break, when few people are on
campus. Another study we worked on
was delayed three months after an
IRB asked university lawyers to review
a protocol to determine whether it
would violate state wiretap laws.
In another case, researchers at Indiana University worked with their
IRB and the school’s network security group to send out phishing attacks
based on data gleaned from Facebook.g
Because of the delays associated with
the approval process, the phishing
messages were sent out at the end of
the semester, just before exams, rather
than at the beginning of the semester. Many recipients of the email complained vociferously about the timing.
Another reason computer scientists
have problems with IRBs is the level
of detail the typical IRB application
requires. Computer scientists, for the
most part, are not trained to carefully
plan out an experiment in advance, to
g T. Jagatic, N. Johnson, M. Jakobsson, and F.
Menczer. Social phishing. Commun. ACM 50,
10 (Oct. 2007), 94–100.
it is becoming
increasingly easy
to collect human
subjects data over
the internet that
needs to be properly
protected to avoid
harming subjects.
figure out which data will be collected,
and then to collect the results in a manner that protects the privacy of the data
subjects. (Arguably, computer scientists would benefit from better training on experimental design, but that
is a different issue.) We have observed
that many IRB applications are delayed
because of a failure on the part of CS
researchers to make these points clear.
Finally, many computer scientists
are unfamiliar with the IRB process
and how it applies to them, and may
be reluctant to engage with their IRB
after having heard nothing but complaints from colleagues who have
had their studies delayed by a slow
IRB approval process. While the
studies that CS researchers perform
are often exempt or extremely low
risk, it is becoming increasingly easy
to collect human subjects data over
the Internet that needs to be properly protected to avoid harming subjects. Likewise, the growing amount
of research involving honeypots, bot-nets, and the behavior of anonymity
systems would seem to require IRBs,
since the research involves not just
software, but humans—both criminals and victims.
The risks to human subjects from
computer science research are not al-
ways obvious, and the IRB can play an
important role in helping computer sci-
entists identify these risks and insure
that human subjects are adequately
protected. Is there a risk that data col-
lected on computer security incidents
could be used by employers to identify
underperforming computer security
administrators? Is there a risk that ano-
nymized search engine data could be
re-identified to reveal what particular
individuals are searching for? Can net-
work traffic data collected for research
purposes be used to identify copyright
violators? Can posts to LiveJournal and
Facebook be correlated to learn the
identities of children who are frequent-
ly left home alone by their parents?
h § 46. 110 (b)
Simson L. Garfinkel ( slgarfin@nps.edu) is an associate
professor at the u.S. naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, CA.
Lorrie Faith Cranor ( lorrie+@cs.cmu.edu) is an associate
professor of computer science and engineering and public
policy and the director of the CyLab usable Privacy and
Security Laboratory at Carnegie Mellon university in
Pittsburgh, PA.