that financial industry professionals in
investment banks, brokerages, pension
funds, and other organizations lacked
the tools to treat simultaneous crises
from operational, credit, and market
risks through an integrated risk assessment. This was not the kind of crisis IT
specialists planned for.
Liquidity crisis
The collapse of Northern Rock, the
U.K.’s fifth-largest bank, was the visible warning of the debacle to come.
When Northern Rock was taken over
by the British government in February
2008, no one considered the problems
as related to IT. The crisis of Northern
Rock was not big enough for that purpose. However, when Lehman Brothers
failed on September 15, 2008 the role of
IT in the debacle became clear. When
Lehman Brothers faltered, financial institutions around the world were forced
to reevaluate their risk exposure almost
instantly. All of their IT systems were
built on presumptions of an orderly
flow of prudent business transactions;
no one had imagined that the transactions themselves might be the problem.
Lehman Brothers was an investment
bank, an essential intermediary in
global credit markets. Many banks had
hundreds of millions of dollars queued
up in payments to Lehman Brothers
when the news broke. There were no IT
routines in place to stop such transactions once they were initiated.
When it became clear that money
was about to go into a black hole, the
IT specialists in the banks did the only
thing they could do: they pulled the plug
on the IT infrastructure, thereby halting
all operations. Banks around the world
became risky partners simply because
no one knew who was risky and who
was not. All transactions were stopped
and cash flow came to a halt. This was
the dreaded “liquidity crisis” that is still
being discussed widely. The only way
banks could avoid sending good money after bad was to disconnect the IT
systems from the global financial networks. Within hours, the lightning-fast
global financial system had slowed to
the speed of the pre-computer era. The
effects were pervasive, hitting even the
smallest financial institutions in the
most remote corners of the Earth.
This crisis was not caused by IT,
but an imbalance in IT infrastructure
it was not possible
to assess risks of
transactions as they
occurred, so financial
industry experts
simply assumed the
transactions were oK.
played a major role in its origin. The
problem was a discrepancy between
two essential capabilities: the ability to
execute transactions and the ability to
comprehend the implications of the
transactions being executed. IT departments within financial institutions
were able to deliver “millisecond information flows” for real-time processing
of transactions. However, they could not
support counterparty credit risk calculations at speeds to match the transactions. It was not possible to assess risks
of transactions as they occurred, so
financial industry experts simply assumed the transactions were OK. A
few experts making risky assumptions
might be protected if the vast majority
of experts are executing due diligence
and evaluating risks carefully. The few
benefit from the equivalent of “herd
immunity” in vaccinations against disease. When all of the experts assume
the transactions are OK, serious trouble
can follow.
Credit risk calculations require a
lot of work. The data for them must be
gathered from many—sometimes several hundred—data warehouses. Data
in such systems is often inconsistent
and subject to quality control problems.
During crises expert analysts often face
absurdly simple but debilitating problems, such as trying to determine what
the headers in their data sets mean, or
trying to deduce which financial partners have provided given data. It seems
difficult to believe that such data problems were allowed to continue even as
IT sped up transactions to light speed.
But as it often happens with IT, different parts of the IT ecology develop at
different speeds.
Calendar
of Events
May 17–19
Computing Frontiers
Conference,
Bertinoro, italy,
sponsored: siGMiCro,
Contact: Nancy M amato,
email: amato@cs.tamu.edu
May 26–28
The international Conference
on advanced Visual interfaces,
rome, italy,
Contact: Giuseppe santucci,
email: santucci@dis.uniroma1.it
June 1–4
23rd international Conference
on industrial, engineering &
other applications of applied
intelligent systems,
Cordoba, spain,
Contact: Moonis ali,
email: ma04@txstate.edu
June 1–4
international Conference on
supercomputing,
Tsukuba, Japan,
Contact: Taisuke Boku,
email: taisuke@cs.tsukuba.
ac.jp
June 3–4
The 20th international
Workshop on Network and
operating systems support for
digital audio and Video,
amsterdam, Netherlands,
Contact: dick Bulterman,
email: dick.bulterman@cwi.nl
June 4–5
design science research in
information systems and
Technologies,
st. Gallen, switzerland,
Contact: Purao sandeep,
email: sandeep-purao@psu.edu
June 5–7
international symposium
on Memory Management,
Toronto, oN Canada,
Contact: Vitek Jan,
email: jv@cs.purdue.edu
June 5–6
aCM siGPLaN-siGsoFT
Workshop on Program
analysis for software Tools
and engineering,
Toronto, oN Canada,
Contact: atanas rountev,
email: rountev@cse.ohio-state.edu