continuum with computer experts falling at different places in terms of their adherence to standards and recognition of professional or social values. Perhaps the most striking characteristic of computing is variability. Clients, customers, and the public encounter computer experts with a wide range of qualifications, experience, and competence. There is enormous variation in the kinds of jobs that computer experts have, in the nature of their expertise, and in the type and amount of education they have. Education is perhaps the easiest way to distinguish one computer professional from another, though it isn’t necessarily the most telling. Certification is another means by which skill and competence are established, though certification is used for fairly narrow domains of expertise.
Certification and degrees in higher education are means by which individuals obtain “credentials”; they fulfill one of the functions that are associated with professions. In the paradigm of professions, a single overarching organization such as the American Medical Association is in charge of credentialing. In computing, software engineering is the subfield that has taken the biggest steps toward professionalization. The field has adopted curriculum requirements in higher education, requirements that are targeted to ensure a particular kind of competence. The state of Texas has taken the establishment of requirements one step further by creating a system for software engineering licenses. Still, software engineering aside, variation is the most salient feature of computer experts.
A key feature of any profession— from the perspective of professional ethics—is how it manages the differential in knowledge between its members (experts) and those whom they serve. Computer experts generally work either as employees in organizations (including corporations, government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations) or as consultants hired to perform work for clients. Often their employer or client does not have the expertise to understand or evaluate the work being performed. Moreover, the work of computer experts often has implications for many who are indirectly affected—users of the products produced, recipients of services that
are computerized, the public who rely on computerized systems in everything from public transportation to the Internet. The important question here is: how do computer experts understand and manage their relationships with non-experts who rely upon them?
These relationships are central to practice in the field and how experts manage these relationships is an important aspect of professional ethics. Consider the following three different ways to conceptualize expert/non-expert relationships. First, computer experts might think of themselves as merely agents. They might presume that their client, employer, or supervisor is in charge and the expert’s role is merely to implement the decisions made by those higher up. Essentially the expert sees him- or herself as the means to an employer’s or client’s ends. This model takes us back to thinking about computer experts as guns-for-hire. There are at least two problems in adopting this model. First, we know that when computer experts implement decisions, they often have a good deal of latitude and their choices can have powerful consequences. “Code is law” as Lawrence Lessig argued in his 1999 book, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. The work of computer experts may structure an environment, facilitate and constrain behavior, and materialize social values in one form or another. To characterize this work as
that of an agent is to deny the real power that computer experts have. Second, if computer experts operate as if they are agents, their clients and employers don’t get the full benefit of their expertise. Clients, employers, and the public need computer expertise for higher-order decisions, that is, they need help identifying goals and strategies, not just implementation. When you go to a doctor, you don’t tell the doctor what to do, leaving implementation to the doctor’s discretion; you want the doctor to determine what needs to be done and to discuss with you the options that are available; you want the doctor to explain the risks and benefits of alternative approaches.
Second, we might think of the proper role for computer experts as pater-nalistic. Computer experts, it might be argued, are in the best position to understand needs, comprehend potential risks and benefits, as well as foresee the consequences of implementing a system in various ways. Thus, non-experts need computer experts to act on their behalf. According to this model, a client, employer, or the public should transfer all decision-making authority to the computer expert. This provides what is missing in the first model for clients, employers, and the public to get the full benefit of the expert’s knowledge. The problem is that computer experts aren’t experts with regard to values, interests, and preferences. The model oversteps the expertise of anyone who is competent in computing for no matter how well trained or how much experience a computer expert has, he or she is not an expert on someone else’s needs and values.
The third model of the relationship between non-experts and experts combines elements of the first two models and is best suited to the complexities of decision making in computing. It is a model in which experts and those whom they serve share responsibility. Decisions are made through interaction and iteration. Referred to as the fiduciary model (“fiduciary” means trust), this model calls for a relationship of trust between experts and non-experts. The client/employer/public must trust the expert to use his or her knowledge to pursue their interests and values. The professional must trust that the client/employer/public
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