Vviewpoints
DOI: 10.1145/1378727.1378738
IT Policy
Science Policy Isn’t
Always About Science
What is the appropriate role and level of influence for science
and technical advice in policy deliberations?

THIRTEEN yEARS AGO this month, a newly empowered Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives, committed to a “ Contract with America” that included self-imposed austerity measures in an effort to reduce the size of government, took aim at a small legislative branch agency with the job of providing non-partisan, objective information to Congress about the impact of technology. By agreeing to shutter the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1995, Congress managed to save $22 million in the roughly $2 billion appropriations bill funding congressional salaries, support staff, and related operations—and committed what one critic has called a “stunning act of self-lobotomy.” ^a

The OTA’s mission was to help resolve a challenging problem for policymakers—navigating the intersection of technical and scientific issues with policy-making. During its 23 years of operation it produced more than 750 reports on a wide variety of products from fusion energy to infertility. But Congress had begun to question the relevancy of the agency, noting that there were other entities like the General Accounting Office (now Government Accountability Office), the National Academies, and the Congressional Research Service that were providing ostensibly similar products to Congress.

a C. Mooney, “Requiem for an Office.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (Sept./Oct. 2005).

The Republican Chair of the House Science Committee complained that though the agency produced detailed and voluminous reports, they often lagged critical debates and languished on Congressional shelves. ^b In addition, though the agency strived to produce reports that were scientifically rigorous and non-partisan, reports questioning the goals and technical feasibility of the Reagan Administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative anti-ballistic missile system soured the office to many of SDI’s supporters in Congress.

The Republican Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, railed against the office and its 150-member staff, claiming that what Congress needed was scientists and engineers speaking directly to members of Congress, not working through the filter of OTA’s “bureaucracy.” The OTA made for “bureaucratic science,” he later said.^c “Congress needs first-rate scientists talking to its members. It does not need congressional staff analysts talking to congressional staff members to develop staff-driven documents that are then presented to congressmen.”^d

Though OTA and its supporters an-

b W. O’Leary, “Congress’s Science Agency Prepares to Close its Doors.” New York Times, (Sept. 24, 1995), 26.

c Remarks before the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, The National Academies, Oct. 6, 2005 (see www.cra.org/ govaffairs/blog/archives/ 000419.html).

d See http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/ 2008/03/14/newt-gingrich-answers-your- questions/.

swered these criticisms—for example, many pointed out that while GAO, the National Academies, and CRS all produced reports, none were equipped or attempted to bridge policy and science in the way that OTA did; and the idea of members of Congress each having the wherewithal to identify appropriate voices from the technical fields on their own to glean from them the key points relevant to making policy was somewhat absurd—the politics of the moment overwhelmed them and the agency lost its funding.

The elimination of OTA set simmering a debate in policy circles about the role and prominence of science and technical advice in policy deliberations that continues today. Much of that discussion, including some that has appeared in previous issues of Communications,^e is focused on making a renewed case for a native technical assessment capability for Congress and refuting the claims of OTA’s critics. There have been several legislative attempts to revive the agency in the 13 years since its closing, but none have gained serious traction—though the FY 2008 Omnibus appropriation included $2.5 million for a small technical assessment role for the GAO.

While it is easy to see this development as a net loss for the science community—and on balance, it likely is—

e J. Peha, “The Growing Debate Over Science and Technology Advice for Congress.” Commun. ACM 44, 12 (Dec. 2001), 29.