The type of good largely determines the type and LEVEL OF

VULNERABILITY to the threats associated with GARN.

 

tine infected devices and examine new access points for usability and standard compliance [ 2].

Content. Vandalism and corruption of files is relatively easy, as these are nonexcludable goods. A useful countermeasure against potential vandalism in Wikipedia is the “change history” function, which makes it easy to restore content. Moreover, the platform alerts users whenever a specific page is changed. In addition, potential vandalism stemming from differences over content may be thwarted by the fact that it is easy to create a new entry. In severe cases of vandalism, Wikipedia is able to block user accounts, anonymous IP addresses, and IP ranges (see Table 3).

 

CONCLUSION

The type of good largely determines the type and level of vulnerability to the threats associated with GARN. Volunteer-based OSS and knowledge-based content—both public goods—are susceptible to free riding, which in turn may be a major threat to their existence. However, being nonrival, software and content are not susceptible to threats stemming from nonexcludability. Computing grids are more easily protected from free riding due to their excludability and the agreements among participants in two-way grids. Motivational issues may help mitigate the associated threats. Wireless networks—another example of a common good—are susceptible to the threat of free riding.

The GARN phenomenon has implications for both business and policy making. One way for companies to take advantage of the GARN phenomenon is to operate as intermediaries between givers and receivers; for example, a company may create an exchange for such resources as content, network access, or computing power. Other potential ways to capitalize on GARN may be for companies to contribute resources and use this contribution as a vehicle for marketing (such as contributing network access and using it to display the company’s logo and other messages).

In terms of policy making, GARN seems to offer a more efficient use of resources, allowing better access to products and services for people who otherwise could not afford it. At the same time, GARN involves legal implications (such as ownership of IP and responsibil-

ity for actions through GARN-available resources).

Further research is needed to better understand and utilize the GARN phenomenon. While we have applied a descriptive, qualitative focus here, it may focus on such issues as the motivational and behavioral factors underlying GARN, the economic analysis of this model, and its legal implications.

 

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ODED NOV ( [e-mail]) is an assistant professor in the Department of Management, Polytechnic University, New York. BHARAT RAO ( [e-mail]) is an associate professor in the Department of Management, Polytechnic University, New York.

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